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 Abstract 
In recent decades, economic growth in developing economies and the growth of the middle class 
lead to a surge in energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Within the framework of the 
United Nations (UN) sustainable development goals established in 2015, the solution to poverty and 
inequality thus comes into conflict with climate change mitigation.  
The existing international system of climate regulation does not address this contradiction. 
Today, global climate governance relies on estimates of aggregate emissions by countries without 
considering their level of development and the distribution of emissions among income groups 
within each country. Emissions from production are being monitored, while consumption-related 
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emissions, albeit known to experts, rarely underlie decision-making. Meanwhile, income 
distribution has a higher impact on consumption-based emissions in comparison to production-
based ones. Decisions on emissions regulation are made at the national level by countries with 
different development agendas in which climate change mitigation often gets less priority in 
comparison to other socio-economic objectives. 
This paper proposes a set of principles and specific mechanisms that can link climate change 
and inequality within a single policy framework. First, we highlight the need to modify the global 
emission monitoring system for the sake of accounting for emissions from consumption (rather than 
production) by income groups. Second, we suggest the introduction of a new redistribution system 
to address climate change which would include the imposition of a “fine” on households with the 
highest levels of emissions. Such a system follows the principles of progressive taxation but 
supports climate mitigation objectives and should be understood not as taxation of high incomes but 
rather as payment for a negative externality. Third, we outline the need to adjust climate finance 
criteria; priority should be given to projects designed to reduce carbon-intensive consumption by 
social groups entering the middle class, or to help the poorest population groups adapt to climate 
change. A special role in the implementation of these principles may belong to BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa), which may view this as an opportunity for a proactive 
transition to inclusive, low-carbon development. 
 
Key words: climate change; inequality; energy consumption; greenhouse gas emissions; 
sustainable development 
Introduction 
In global governance research and practice, problems of climate change are traditionally considered 
at the country level, and do not engage the question of the distribution of responsibilities for 
emissions within countries. However, the dynamics of global emissions are determined not only by 
countries, but by specific population groups within them — primarily groups with relatively high 
incomes and corresponding consumption patterns. 
High household incomes in developed countries and the increasing incomes of the 
wealthiest population groups in developing economies lead to high and ever-growing energy 
consumption — by the transportation sector and households, by companies producing consumer 
goods for their needs, and by the government producing public goods. This consideration may seem 
trivial, but the dynamics of emissions should be considered, raising the question of what happens 
when a country or a social group moves from relative poverty to a higher level of income. 
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At the country level, climate change is often analyzed with regard to the stage of a country’s 
industrialization, and its progress transitioning to a post-industrial economy [Bell, 1976]. 
Developed counties have to a large extent finished this transition. Rapid economic growth in recent 
decades has brought many “third world” countries out of extreme poverty. Leading developing 
countries such as China, Brazil, and the countries of Southeast Asia have achieved significant 
success in moving toward a decent standard of living [Grigoryev, Pavlyushina, 2018].  
If we measure the progress in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth and the 
success in overcoming poverty, the world, of course, shows good results [Grigoryev, 2016]. 
However, the question arises: is the world moving toward sustainable development, in particular 
toward achieving the sustainable development goals (SDGs) approved by almost 150 countries for 
2030? One of the key problems is how to link the observed increase in incomes and the associated 
increase in energy consumption with climate change mitigation, and in particular, with the need to 
limit the global temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels, which is the goal set by the 
Paris Agreement [2015]. 
By 2018, global GDP (purchasing power parity (PPP), constant 2011 Intl$) increased by 
155% compared to 1992, and GDP per capita went up by 78% [World Bank, n.d.]. Of course, the 
efficiency of production and consumption has significantly increased, and for this reason 
greenhouse gas emissions increased only 55% by the end of this period, reaching a plateau in recent 
years [Olivier, Peters, 2018]. But the result is far from sufficient: in order to achieve the 2-degree 
target, zero net carbon emissions are needed. 
Taking into account the current state of international cooperation and technical progress, a 
solution to the climate change problem is impeded by the following issues: 
 not all clean technologies with the necessary parameters will be invented in time; 
 not all invented technologies will be available where they are most needed due to the 
mechanisms to protect intellectual property rights; 
 funding of the ambitious objectives of climate change mitigation and adaptation is still a 
problem that has not been resolved in international climate negotiations; 
 measures to cope with climate change in a number of developed and developing 
countries depend on electoral cycles that are difficult to synchronize to jointly solve 
global problems; and 
 the ability of world elites to compromise in order to solve global problems is limited, 
which is reflected in geopolitical conflicts, in the slow decision-making process of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) [1992], and the 
framework nature of the Paris Agreement [2015]. 
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This paper argues that climate action (SDG 13) should be considered together with the task 
of reducing inequality (SDG 10). This paper outlines a system of principles bridging solutions to 
these two problems within a single policy framework. It is not the first attempt of this kind. For 
instance, L. Chancel and T. Piketty [2015] underline the importance of progressive carbon taxation 
and provide a positive example of a global tax on air tickets; however, this is too limited to serve as 
a global solution. J. Davies, X. Shi and J. Whalley [2014] consider a hypothetical global carbon tax, 
income from which is supposed to be redistributed among the poor in order to mitigate significantly 
the effects of carbon regulation on inequality. However, the authors themselves recognize that such 
a tax is a practical impossibility under the existing system of global governance. 
Our proposal is based on a more feasible decile approach to the regulation of carbon 
emissions, suggesting that different regulatory instruments should be used for different income 
groups — from early warning measures for deciles which only approach the middle-class level to a 
full-fledged climate tax for wealthy strata. Under such a system of measures, taxes on consumption 
by wealthy social groups could be the main source of funds for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation worldwide. Further allocation of these funds could be focused on providing access to 
clean technologies and green consumption practices to social groups that are on the verge of 
transition to a “consumer society,” as well as supporting adaptation to climate change in poor 
countries, where it causes the greatest damage to the population.  
In addition to accumulating funds to address climate change, the proposed system of 
measures would contribute to a more equitable distribution of income, aiming to solve the systemic 
problem of growing inequality. It is essentially an alternative to the system of global progressive 
taxation that has been discussed widely in the last few years [Piketty, 2014]. However, it is an 
alternative which is comprehensive and fair. First, the system proposed in this paper can be 
interpreted as a compensation for negative externalities necessary to solve a global problem, rather 
than as an income tax. Second, it focuses on segments of society that have the financial resources 
not only for consumption but also to solve global problems. It is fundamentally important that this 
applies not only to developed but also to emerging economies, where the high-income groups may 
well share the responsibility for emissions with similar strata in the developed world. 
The BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa may play a crucial 
role here. It is they who represent a substantial share of the world’s poor and are among the world’s 
largest emitters. At the same time, they have growing middle classes, which are adopting western-
style patterns of consumption, and also some wealthy strata with incomes comparable to those of 
the wealthiest strata in the developed countries. 
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The paper is structured as follows. First, it provides an overview of theoretical ideas about 
the relationship between income growth (and related inequality growth) and emissions. Then, it 
demonstrates how income distribution is related to the distribution of emissions in practice, using 
the cases of four countries that provide a fairly diverse coverage. Reasons are discussed for the 
limited ability of the current climate regime to respond to rising incomes and the transition of large 
population groups in developing countries to the middle class. A number of principles aimed at 
improving the international climate change regime are proposed, and several conclusions are 
offered. 
The Relationship Between Income and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Overview 
The simplest way to show the interrelation between human impact on the environment and the level 
of income is the IPAT model (where impact (I) is the product of population (P), affluence (A) and 
technology (T)) [Ehrlich, Holdren, 1971], which was later adapted to the case of greenhouse gases 
[Kaya, 1989]: 
 
where E = emissions, P = population, Y = GDP, = GDP per capita and  = carbon intensity of 
GDP 
Based on this identity, it can be inferred that as the population and GDP inevitably grow on 
a global scale it is necessary to reduce carbon intensity in order to combat climate change, which is 
possible through technological development [Gates, Gates, 2016]. This is already partially 
implemented in practice. However, technological innovations occur mainly in developed countries, 
where population growth is minimal or even negative, while income growth is small. At the same 
time, in developing countries growing populations living in expanding economies are engaged in 
economic activity using the old and less energy-efficient technologies which are largely responsible 
for emissions growth [Han, Chatterjee, 1997]. Therefore, it is important to develop new 
technologiesprimarily in the leading developing countries. 
In reality the story is more complicated: a growing population in the poorest countries, even 
with outdated technologies, has a minimal impact on emissions due to the extremely low level of 
consumption. To take into account the difference in consumption, instead of the IPAT model it is 
more appropriate to use the ICAT model, where C denotes consumption, or the ImPACT model 
[Waggoner, Ausubel, 2002; York, Rosa, Dietz, 2003] which in terms of greenhouse gas emissions 
can be presented as follows: 
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where С = consumption,  = consumption rate,  = the intensity of carbon consumption 
The main danger for the climate is not demographic or economic growth, but rather growth 
in the number of consumers who are adopting a lifestyle with a higher carbon footprint while still 
using outdated technologies. The growing numbers of such consumers in China, India and other 
leading emerging economies has resulted in an increase of emissions in recent decades, and this will 
determine the dynamics of emissions in the future. The international climate regime that 
concentrates on country-level emission estimates does not take this factor into account. 
Another important instrument that can be used to examine the connection between emissions 
and income is the environmental Kuznets curve. Many scholars have tested the hypothesis that the 
relationship between emissions per capita and incomes has an inverted U-shaped curve (for an 
overview, see D. Kaika and E. Zervas [2013a, 2013b]). The environmental Kuznets curve reflects 
the argument that structural changes are the result of growth in income per capita: in the beginning, 
an extensive expansion of production contributes to per capita growth and leads to a rapid increase 
in greenhouse gas emissions. However, after reaching a certain income level, the sectoral structure 
of the economy changes and becomes led by services. More modern, cleaner technologies are 
introduced, and both people and government begin to place a higher value on the environment, 
while dirty industries are transferred to lower-income countries [Van Alstine, Neumayer, 2010]. 
However, the environmental Kuznets curve is a theoretical hypothesis and empirical testing 
in the case of greenhouse gas emissions yields very contradictory results [Kaika, Zervas, 2013a, 
2013b]. In most cases, as income increases, emissions increase as well. Most empirical studies 
come to the conclusion that the world is still far from the point at which emissions would be 
expected to decline. Further, they conclude that this can be achieved only with a level of income per 
capita that will remain unattainable for most of the world’s population for several decades [Stern, 
2015; Uchiyama, 2016].  
Most of the estimates of the environmental Kuznets curve are applied to production-based 
emissions. But it is even more interesting to test the curve for consumption-based emissions — 
those associated with the production of all goods consumed in a country, including those that are 
produced abroad and then imported. Such estimates show no inverted U-shaped form at all: 
consumption-based emissions increase monotonically with the rise of incomes [Makarov, 2018; 
Mir, Storm, 2015]. The more a country or social group consumes, the more emissions it produces. 
This idea has encouraged the bulk of research on carbon inequality; evidence shows that 
wealthier social groups are responsible for much greater emissions than poorer ones [Chancel, 
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Piketty, 2015; Gore, 2015]. Chancel and Piketty [2015] revealed the significant rise of such 
inequality within countries over the last decades with a simultaneous decrease of carbon inequality 
between countries. The rise of carbon inequality is especially rapid in emerging economies, where 
incomes have been growing rapidly over the last few decades but the elasticity of emission by 
income is not decreasing. In China, the poorest households historically consumed so little energy 
that they produced almost no emissions (only 10% of all emissions come from the 10th decile), 
while the top 50% are responsible for over 80% [Li, Wang, 2010]. In India, relatively wealthy 
households (with income of $10 per capita per day and higher) emit twice as much in volume as all 
other households combined [Grunewald et al., 2012]. These two examples are representative of 
other countries with similar levels of development. This means that further income growth in these 
countries, which will lift large numbers of people out of poverty, will be accompanied by a huge 
increase in emissions despite positive trends in the energy efficiency of firms and household 
consumption. 
Thus, climate change mitigation and coping with poverty and inequality are in many ways 
mutually exclusive goals — in the modern world, success in addressing one challenge inevitably 
leads to the aggravation of the other. 
The Relationship Between the Dynamics of Income and Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
The increase in energy consumption and related greenhouse gas emissions on the path from poverty 
to prosperity is uneven. First comes the transition from energy poverty to minimal energy 
consumption, a transition that significantly improves living standards but has little effect on global 
emissions. A more radical shift in the type of consumption occurs when a social group enters the 
middle class. This creates an increase in demand for heating and cooling of residential and public 
buildings, an active use of transport based on fossil fuels, and an increase in demand for final 
consumer goods and services, from meat to travel. The intermittent increase in energy consumption 
at the stage of the expansion of the middle class leads to lifestyle changes at the level of the 
household and society as a whole. 
So far, relatively few studies focusing on the distribution of emissions by population groups 
have been published. According to B. Milanovic [2016], “there is an unevenness in carbon 
emissions that is seldom recognized and on which empirical research is lacking, despite the 
availability of data. One could easily estimate the distribution of CO2 emissions across the world 
population by income group and not, as is done today, by country. If income elasticity of carbon 
emissions is unitary (i.e., a 10% increase in real income entails a 10% increase in carbon 
emissions), then the Gini coefficient of global carbon emissions is around 70 points, which would 
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mean that more than one-half of all emissions are made by the global top 10%. Almost all the 
people in the top world decile come, as we know, from rich countries. Not from Africa.” T. Gore 
[2015] provides very similar estimates: 10% of the world’s most affluent population actually 
produces almost half of global emissions. Chancel and Piketty [2015] made the same calculations 
using elasticities 0.7, 0.9 and 1.1 and obtained similar results (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Share of CO2 Emissions Concentration, 2013 (%) 
Elasticity Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Middle 
40% 
Bottom 
50% 
Bottom 
10% 
0.9 13.8 31.5 45.2 41.8 13.0 1.2 
0.7 9.9 26.6 40.0 44.8 15.3 1.5 
1.1 19.0 38.0 51.3 38.0 10.7 0.9 
Source: [Chancel, Piketty, 2015]. 
 
A consideration of global carbon inequality helps to describe a general picture, but it has 
limited practical value. It is more important to monitor distribution of emissions within individual 
countries. A database of emissions related to a quintile/decile has yet to be formed. However, it is 
possible to examine individual countries using data taken from various sources. In some cases, the 
data describes emissions, in others it shows energy consumption, closely correlated with emissions. 
Table 2 shows data for the United States. It demonstrates that the emissions of the first 
quintile of the population are already very high (approximately equal to emissions of an average 
person in France), while per capita emissions for the third quintile are much higher than per capita 
emissions in almost all countries. 
 
Table 2. The U.S. Average Household Income and CO2 Emissions per Quintile, 2002–04 
Quintile 
Income ($ 
Thousands) Emissions (t) 
GDP per Capita, PPP 
2000, Intl$ Thousands 
1 13.7 4.7 12.3 
2 24.6 7.1 24.5 
3 36.0 9.2 35.8 
4 52.1 11.4 51.3 
5 102.4 18.5 106.0 
Average 45.8 10.2 51.0 
Source: [Shammin, Bullard, 2009; World Bank, n.d. (authors’ calculations)]. 
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The data for the United Kingdom (Table 3) is similar to the data for the United States. 
Already, for the second decile of income distribution, the levels of wealth and energy consumption 
are high by global standards. 
 
Table 3. Average Annual Energy Consumption per Household by Decile (kW*h) in the UK, 2004–
07 
Decile Electricity Gas Total 
GDP per 
Capita, PPP 
2008, Intl$ 
Thousands 
1 2.608 8.758 11.366 9.9 
2 2.967 10.631 13.598 16.8 
3 3.204 11.767 14.971 
23.0 
4 3.510 12.750 16.260 
5 3.715 14.259 17.974 
31.0 
6 3.942 14.497 18.439 
7 4.263 15.538 19.801 
42.5 
8 4.393 16.498 20.891 
9 4.845 17.815 22.660 57.6 
10 5.585 20.670 26.255 99.7 
Average 3.903 14.318 18.221  
Median 3.426 13.413 16.839  
Source: [White, Roberts, Preston, 2010; World Bank, n.d. (authors’ calculations)]. 
 
The U.S. and UK examples provide an idea of the nature of the distribution of income, 
consumption and emissions in the Anglo-Saxon world. Mexico has an above-average level of 
development, characterized by high income inequality and inequality in energy consumption (Table 
4). For example, the emissions of the fifth quintile exceed emissions of the first by 4.5 times. The 
tenth decile in Mexico has an income of more than $60,000 per capita, which is significantly higher 
than the average income in developed countries. Patterns of consumption for this decile are not 
significantly different from the western ones (although it is less carbon-intensive in comparison to 
Anglo-Saxon countries). 
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Table 4. CO2 Emissions From the Household Use of Main Types of Home Equipment by Emission 
Deciles (Mt of CO2, %) in Mexico, 2006 
Decile 
Decile’s 
Emissions, 
Mt of CO2 
Decile’s 
Share in 
Total 
Emissions, 
% 
Decile’s Share 
in Total 
Income, % 
Emissions per 
Household, t 
СО2 
GDP per Capita 
at PPP 2008, Intl$ 
Thousands 
1 1.3 2.8 1.2 0.5 2.8 
2 2.1 4.4 2.7 0.8 4.7 
3 2.8 5.9 3.8 1.1 
7.0 
4 3.3 6.9 4.8 1.2 
5 3.8 8.1 5.9 1.4 
10.2 
6 4.4 9.3 7.3 1.7 
7 5.0 10.6 9.1 1.9 
15.4 
8 5.9 12.4 11.8 2.2 
9 7.0 14.7 16.4 2.6 24.0 
10 8.5 17.8 37.1 3.2 61.5 
Total 44.0 92.9* 100 1.7 15.8 
Source: [Rosas, Sheinbaum, Morillon, 2010; World Bank, n.d. (authors’ calculations)]. 
 Note: * Not 100% of household emissions can be distributed by deciles. 
 
The data for China is generalized and fragmented (Table 5). It demonstrates that the share 
of emissions of the tenth decile is six times higher than the average share of emissions in the 
second–fifth deciles. The tenth decile creates 28.3% of national emissions. It is possible that, due to 
income growth in recent decades, the ninth and even eighth decile (reflected in Table 5 as part of 
the top 40%), could achieve the same level of consumption and related emissions now or in the near 
future. 
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Table 5. Distribution of CO2 Emissions in China by Income Group, 2002 
Grouping* 
Tons of CO2 
per Capita 
Share of 
Population, % 
Share of 
Emissions, % 
Annual 
Consumption 
Expenses 
(RMB per 
Capita) 
GDP per 
Capita at 
PPP 2008, 
$ 
Thousands 
10th Decile 6.3 7.6 28.3 9,974 25.3 
Top 40% 2.5 35.6 51.8 4,831  
Bottom 40% 0.7 44.0 18.3 1,727  
1st Decile 0.2 12.8 1.6 864 1.6 
Source: [Li, Wang, 2010; World Bank, n.d. (authors’ calculations)]. 
Note: *In the source “decile” means not one tenth of the population, but a group of people 
with significantly different incomes, whose number is close to one tenth 
 
The data for these four countries is very fragmentary. However, even these statistics are 
enough to form a picture describing realities of the global distribution of emissions by income 
groups. 
We do not have enough data on the BRICS countries to create a reliable picture of the 
distribution of emissions among income groups. But it is these countries that will be responsible for 
most of the increase of global emissions in coming decades. This increase will be determined 
primarily by the expansion of the middle class with western-style consumption patterns and the 
rising consumption of the top income deciles. 
The BRICS group consists of economies with substantial differences in the level of 
development and economic growth models. China, while being comparable in population with 
India, produces almost 2.5 times as much per GDP (PPP). The dispersion of GDP (PPP) per capita 
in current prices within BRICS was 3.9 times greater in 2017. At the same time, South Africa 
demonstrates the highest social inequality, while being in the middle of the distribution. In 2017, 
the share of income in the wealthiest (10th) decile was 50.5% in South Africa, 40.4% in Brazil, 
31.4% in China, 29.8% in India and 29.7% in Russia. 
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Table 6. Inequality in BRICS and Population, 2017* 
 
Income Share Populatio
n, 
Millions  
Highest 
10% 
Highest 
20% 
Fourth 
20% 
Third 
20% 
Second 
20% 
Lowest 
20% 
Lowest 
10% 
Brazil 41.9 57.8 19.5 12.2 7.4 3.2 1 209.5 
Russia 29.7 45.3 21.5 15.2 11.1 6.9 2.8 144.5 
India 30.1 44.4 20.5 15.2 11.7 8.1 3.5 1352.6 
China 29.4 45.4 22.3 15.3 10.6 6.4 2.6 1392.7 
South 
Africa 
50.5 68.2 16.5 8.2 4.8 2.4 0.9 57.8 
Source: [World Bank, n.d.]. 
Note: *or latest available year 
 
BRICS countries are the first that are shifting from low and middle to high incomes in a 
world constrained by concerns about emissions and fossil fuels. If they make this shift using 
conventional development models and following western consumption patterns, we will definitely 
have a climate catastrophe. Therefore, the crucial question of global climate action is whether 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are able to adopt climate-friendly pathways on their 
way to prosperity which could be later used as a template for less-developed countries like 
Indonesia and those in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The Current Climate Change Regime and Its Shortcomings 
Coping with global climate change requires the coordination of efforts among all leading countries. 
The main document that declares the objective to combat climate change is the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change adopted in 1992 [UNFCCC, 1992]. The quantitative commitments 
to achieve this objective were specified in the Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997. 
The Kyoto Protocol played an important role in the development of international climate 
cooperation, but it was ineffective in and of itself. Its targets were too weak, and it was unable to 
consider the major shifts that occurred in the world economy in the 1990–2000s. These shifts 
included the deep structural crises in economies in transition, and the transformation of a number of 
developing countries into developed ones (for example, Korea and Singapore). And most 
importantly, being concentrated on wealthy countries, the Kyoto Protocol did not adequately 
address the challenge of rapid economic growth in India, and especially in China, which 
transformed these countries into leading emitters of greenhouse gases. From 1990 to 2012, China 
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and India increased greenhouse gas emissions by 3.6 and 2.4 times, respectively. This increase more 
than offset the reduction of emissions in developed economies. 
In 2015, the Kyoto Protocol was replaced by the Paris Agreement, which has already 
entered into force, having been ratified by 187 countries to date. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, it is 
non-binding in terms of emissions reduction, but it is universal: it includes developing countries as 
full participants. In addition, the Paris Agreement is based on the bottom-up principle: countries 
themselves set their own emission reduction goals (the so-called “nationally determined 
contributions” (NDCs)) based on their energy development plans, growth of carbon-intensive 
industries, and the economy as a whole [Makarov, Stepanov, 2018; Savaresi, 2016]. Basically, these 
goals are nothing more than benchmarks for the states declaring them. Moreover, even their full 
implementation will not make it possible to reach a temperature increase pathway of less than 2°C 
compared to the pre-industrial era [Climate Action Tracker, 2017]. Donald Trump’s declaration on 
the withdrawal by the U.S. from the Paris Agreement makes the situation even worse.  
In certain sense, the Paris Agreement delegates the definition of emission reduction 
pathways to the national level, leaving to international climate cooperation only the function of 
coordinating national climate policies. However, at the national level, mitigation policies will 
inevitably remain a derivative of the social and economic policies of individual countries that are at 
different stages of development and have different strategic priorities and tactical agendas [Victor, 
Jones, 2018]. This limits the scope for coordinated action by governments and civil societies on a 
global scale. 
In developing countries, emissions growth is still closely associated with income growth. 
The surge in energy consumption does not occur at the stage of overcoming poverty (during which 
energy consumption is low). Rather, it is tied to later stages of development, leading to rapid 
motorization, wider use of air conditioning, complication of lifestyle, and increased mobility, 
among other trends. A failure to consider changes in the social structure of the economy and the 
different carbon footprints of various income groups will make ambitious reductions in emissions 
more difficult. 
The established international climate change regime cannot prevent the spread of western 
consumer behaviour patterns to emerging economies, where large groups of people are entering the 
middle class and expanding their consumption of goods and services that are still produced using 
outdated carbon-intensive technologies. Nor can it prevent the carbon-intensive consumer 
behaviour of middle- and upper-income deciles in developed countries, which already follow this 
consumer model to the full extent. Even if considerable financial resources are accumulated, the 
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solution to these problems is barely possible within the current system of international climate 
institutions.  
First, the existing system of international cooperation is based on counting emissions by 
countries as a whole. It does not capture the forces driving the growth of emissions within each 
country. Decisions on specific emission reduction mechanisms (taxes, emissions trading, subsidies 
for the development of clean technologies, etc.) are also made at the country level. At the same 
time, the goal to reduce emissions in many economies contradicts other national goals including 
raising living standards, ensuring energy security, promoting economic growth, and so on. The 
story is even more complicated due to electoral cycles that can impede long-term decisions. 
Second, the international climate change regime is based on tracking domestic emissions 
(so-called production-based emissions), and not those emissions that occur in the production of 
goods consumed in a country (so-called consumption-based emissions) [Davis, Caldeira, 2010; 
Makarov, Sokolova, 2014]. Changes in income levels and consumption patterns affect production-
based emissions to a much lesser extent, as long as some emissions are generated for the production 
of goods exported to other countries (in the leading emerging economies the share of emissions 
embodied in exports can be very high). Since the relationship between production-based emissions 
and the social structure of a society is not direct and obvious, the issue of accounting for emissions 
by income group has traditionally received little attention. At the same time, while the relationship 
between the social structure and consumption-based emissions is direct and strong, the 
consumption-based approach remains beyond the interests and responsibilities of international 
organizations [Steininger et al., 2014]. 
Third, the current system of international institutions is based on a polycentric approach 
[Cole, 2015; Oberthür, 2016; Ostrom, 2014]. Today, the list of international organizations which 
deal with climate change include a range of institutions within the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, the World Bank (financing climate-related projects), the UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP) and others. The Group of 20 and BRICS are also paying more and more 
attention to climate change issues. Climate change research is the responsibility of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Certain aspects of the problem are dealt with 
by specialized international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Combating climate change is also a part of the SGDs adopted at the 
UN General Assembly. In parallel, there is a network of highly influential and financially supported 
international non-governmental organizations (World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Greenpeace, Oxfam, 
etc.) as well as various research institutes. Finally, significant efforts to combat climate change are 
  
15 
 
made in different countries, regions and municipalities, as well as at the level of individual 
companies. 
This diversity has its advantages, such as greater flexibility and independence from the 
decisions of specific individuals. At the same time, it is characterized by a lack of coordination 
between different institutions. This makes it extremely difficult to balance the inherently conflicting 
goals of reducing poverty/inequality and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Modifications to Global Governance in Climate Change Based on the Decile 
Emission Management Approach 
It would be useful to supplement the existing system of institutions with add-ons that will allow: 
 coordination of work on the achievement of two SGDs — climate action (goal 13) and 
reducing inequality (goal 10) — in order to prevent conflict between them, and 
strengthening of the interaction of institutions addressing inequality and climate change; 
 creation of a system of incentives for wealthy households and households with growing 
incomes that will encourage them to restructure their consumption in accordance with the 
requirements of emission reduction; and 
 access to relatively less carbon-intensive technologies and consumer behaviour patterns for 
households on the threshold of a transition to a consumer society. 
The implementation of these goals is possible through the following mechanisms. 
 
Consolidation of Efforts by Scientists and Experts 
It is appropriate to create a special working group that monitors countries’ emissions and operates 
under the auspices of the World Bank (possibly in collaboration with the UN Department of Social 
and Economic Affairs, the IPCC, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the IEA). Its functions could focus on several aspects of emissions accounting. First, it 
could consider consumption-based emissions. Strictly speaking, it is not important where 
greenhouse gases are emitted, but rather for what purpose they are emitted. Emissions accounting 
based exclusively on the production approach leads to carbon leakage [Aichele, Felbermayr, 2013] 
and prevents the rise of climate action ambitions even in enthusiastic societies. Developed countries 
which would no longer have carbon-intense production would continue to report on green 
development, although their emissions from consumption as well as global emissions would keep 
growing. Second, it could take account of the structure of emissions in relation to different income 
groups within countries, as well as changes in this structure resulting from economic development. 
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Third, it could make projections of emissions by country taking into account expected economic 
growth and the evolution of income distribution within countries. 
Ultimately, conceptualizing a quintile/decile approach to analyzing country-level emissions 
could help the special working group to identify key population groups whose incomes in the future 
will determine the dynamics of emissions in a given country. 
 
Development of a New Regulatory System for Income Groups That Have Achieved Income 
Thresholds 
Incentives should be calibrated, starting with some signaling measures for groups that are on the 
threshold of joining consumer society, and ending with a full-fledged carbon tax on high-income 
deciles. Such a system of redistribution is fiscally progressive, but it is different from progressive 
income taxes in that revenues are spent on specific climate-related measures. 
Linking the social structure of society with the concept of consumption-based emissions, it 
is possible to divide countries’ income quintiles/deciles into several groups with corresponding 
policy measures. 
Group A includes deciles above the threshold of GDP per capita of $15,000 (PPP, constant 
2011 Intl$) which corresponds approximately to the level of development of “middle-income 
countries” according to the classification scheme of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). This group is characterized by increased use of vehicles and motor fuels, 
increased consumption of durable goods, in particular heating and cooling systems, and growing 
mobility, among other things [Grigoryev, Pavlyushina, 2019]. Entry to the group is followed by a 
fundamental shift in the patterns of everyday consumption, as well as by a surge in the consumption 
of public services and the use of public buildings.  
Regulatory measures targeting this group should be signaling in nature, including carbon 
labeling of products, carbon certification of projects, voluntary carbon pricing, and measures to 
increase public awareness (education programmes). 
Group B includes deciles above the threshold of GDP per capita of $25,000 (PPP, constant 
2011 Intl$) which corresponds approximately to the level of “upper-middle income countries” 
according to the IBRD’s classification. This income level is associated with the transition to large 
volumes of consumption of energy-intensive goods and services. This threshold is being met by the 
high-income groups in the developing world which are guided by the “western lifestyle.” The rapid 
growth of wealth serves as a prerequisite for the intermittent growth of personal consumption, 
including energy consumption. 
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The regulatory system for this group should include intermediate incentive mechanisms: 
some elements of carbon pricing that are not yet punitive in nature. In essence, these measures 
should be a hybrid combining voluntary donations with the full carbon price in the form of a carbon 
tax or an emissions trading system. 
Group C includes deciles above the threshold of per capita GDP of $40,000 (PPP, constant 
2011 Intl$) which corresponds approximately to the current income of the upper-income deciles in 
developed countries and the richest deciles in emerging economies. These groups have an 
opportunity to change their consumption patterns for the better. They can afford a balanced diet, 
modern homes, and healthier lifestyles. The shift toward energy-efficient homes and hybrid/electric 
vehicles may lead to some slowdown in the growth of energy consumption compared with lower 
income groups. 
The system of regulatory measures for this group should include the full price of carbon, 
which can take various forms: a carbon tax or a carbon sales tax (VAT) with tax deductions for low-
income groups of the population; excise and/or carbon duties on goods consumed by upper-income 
groups; progressive income tax, and so on. The measures may vary with respect to distribution of 
income, features of the fiscal system, the role of other taxes, and features of individual national 
economies. 
The described differentiation of income deciles in the leading countries was carried out on 
the basis of a modified decile indicator of income inequality, attaching a certain amount of 
production per capita to each decile in proportion to the decile income distribution [Grigoriev, 
Salmina, 2013]. The proposed indicator — imputed decile GDP per capita — indicates the level of 
GDP per capita of households which belong to a specific decile (in a given country) under the 
assumption that the share of decile income is equal to the share of decile productivity (contribution 
to the country’s GDP) [Grigoriev, 2016]. Based on the calculation of the imputed decile GDP per 
capita, the following distribution of carbon regulation measures is proposed for different countries 
(Table 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
18 
 
Table 7. The Proposed Threshold System for Simulating Emission Reductions for Various Income 
Quintiles by G20 Countries, 2015* 
 
Imputed Decile GDP per Capita, $ 
Thousands 
Quintile Number From 
Which Certain Incentive 
Measures Start 
In the 
Whole 
Country 
5 Quintile 10 
Decile 
A B C 
Argentina 18.9 22.5 29.0 3 4 5 
Australia 41.4 43.6 54.9 1 2 3 
Canada 40.7 41.7 52.4 1 2 4 
France 37.3 38.5 50.1 1 3 4 
Germany 42.7 41.2 50.6 1 2 4 
Indonesia 9.7 11.5 15.4 5 - - 
Italy 35.2 36.7 46.3 2 3 4 
Japan (2008) 36.3 36.0 44.9 2 3 4 
Mexico 16.3 22.2 32.4 4 - 5 
Turkey 18.8 21.8 28.7 3 - 5 
Great Britain 36.7 36.7 45.2 2 3 4 
U.S. 51.0 59.2 76.9 1 2 3 
BRICS 
Brazil 15.2 21.3 30.8 4 5 - 
Russia 24.9 30.1 40.1 3 4 5 
India 4.6 5.1 6.9 - - - 
China 11.1 13.3 17.5 - 5 - 
South Africa 12.2 21.1 31.4 - - 5 
Source: [World Bank, n.d. (authors’ calculations)]. 
Note: *The table includes data for G20 countries except Korea, Saudi Arabia and the EU 
 
All of the proposed measures should be based on the principles of transparency, involve 
clear mechanisms of fundraising, and focus on commonly shared objectives. The measures taken by 
each country should be declared in advance, as in the system of nationally determined contributions 
(NDC) used in the Paris Agreement. 
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In other words, states should declare not only the targets (like the current NDCs), but also 
the tools of emission reduction which would be employed. These tools do not have to be 
reintroduced — existing taxes may be taken into account in order to avoid triple taxation 
(progressive income tax in some countries, tax on energy-intensive goods, and new incentives). 
With a new system of reporting, it would be much easier to check whether the principle of 
additionality is respected, i.e., whether the undertaken efforts are new. In the case of declaring 
targets alone, the latter can be achieved for natural reasons, without any additional efforts, but it is 
almost impossible to prove it. 
 
Building a System to Accumulate Funds  
The funds that could be accumulated using taxes on high deciles, on the one hand, depend on the 
model calculations dedicated to ensuring that the temperature does not rise above 2°C; this will 
inevitably be a subject of negotiations between governments and civil society. Obviously, the 
amount of funds that could be agreed to by all parties cannot be too high. It is unlikely that the 
climate tax on wealthy deciles will raise funds sufficient to fulfill the formal purpose of the Paris 
Agreement, and one should not necessarily strive for that at any cost. It is critically important that 
the funds raised are above the symbolic level and reflect a compromise between governments, 
business and civil society. At the early stage, the introduction of the principle of a climate tax on 
wealthy deciles is more important than the size of the tax. Further, pressure from civil society and 
political competition will ensure the gradual increase of this tax in many leading countries. 
There are two ways to use the collected funds. They can be complementary and 
implemented in a certain proportion. First, there could be a transfer of funds to a special 
international climate fund, to be further allocated to finance climate projects that meet the set of 
criteria (see below). The World Bank could act as the managing body of the fund, and it would 
guarantee the transparency of allocation. Second, direct investments could be made by countries in 
projects that meet the same criteria as those funded by the international climate fund. Determining 
the direction of spending funds without mediation from the climate fund would allow countries to 
align a solution to climate problems with their own socio-economic or political goals. However, in 
this case each project must be accredited by a specialized unit of the fund. 
BRICS countries are key actors in the described process. Moreover, they may initiate it. For 
BRICS countries, the major condition of low-carbon development is its inclusiveness and 
consistence with other development goals such as eliminating poverty, reducing inequality and 
ensuring universal access to basic goods, including energy. The conventional model of climate 
policies based on carbon pricing and subsidizing renewables has been developed and applied 
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relatively successfully in the western world; however, it hardly meets these criteria. The French 
“yellow vests” movement shows that achieving low-carbon ambitions is a challenge even in the 
developed world. In BRICS countries, where societies are already highly unequal and there is a 
need to weaken any fiscal load on the poor, this model is especially difficult to apply. BRICS 
countries require some strong alternatives to be put into place; linking carbon pricing to progressive 
income taxation may be one of them. 
Moreover, BRICS countries already have some joint institutions which may give them the 
opportunity to launch their own mechanisms for climate funding and redistribution instead of 
relying on global ones. For instance, funds accumulated through a progressive carbon tax may be 
allocated collectively on a project basis via the New Development Bank. 
 
Revision of Criteria for Climate Financing  
Funds should be directed mainly to two project types that are not covered by conventional 
development finance or funds already specified in the Paris Agreement. First, funding should 
support those projects that: impact the carbon intensity of consumption by groups approaching the 
threshold values of income; support the cost of providing modern technology and staff training, 
and; widen education to the respective developing countries. Second, funding should also support 
projects focused on adaptation in countries where the proportion of poor people is high, and the 
consequences of climate change may lead to a humanitarian catastrophe. 
The source for these investments could be the $100 billion per year that is supposed to be 
mobilized as climate aid by 2020 (via bilateral aid agencies, international development banks and 
private initiatives), with further increases in funds in the 2020s. The directions for spending have 
not yet been determined, and an analysis of the dependence of consumption of carbon-intensive 
products on incomes will make it possible to clarify efficient criteria for selecting specific projects. 
Some of the funds are already there; in 2016 there was more than $55 billion, and in 2018 there was 
around $80 billion. However, attempts to officially define the direction for spending face resistance 
by developed-country donors. Other possible sources for investments include a new international 
climate fund, formed by a climate tax on wealthy deciles, and funds provided by individual 
countries that prefer to independently finance projects accredited by the international climate fund. 
Conclusion 
The idea of a carbon tax on high-income strata by individual, primarily BRICS, countries or on a 
global basis will require an action plan. Politically, the accumulation of funds sufficient to prevent a 
temperature increase above 2°C can hardly be implemented right away at the global level, 
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especially given the current extent of conflict in the international system. The proposed measures 
are unlikely to be unconditionally accepted by all countries participating in climate regulation 
because such measures will require the transfer of a significant part of state sovereignty to the 
supranational level. 
At the same time, in the long run the transition to the proposed regulatory system is quite 
possible for the leading countries. It may be supported by the most active participants in the 
international climate regime — EU countries and other developed economies (where the share of 
relatively high income groups is greater), which have more homogeneous interests and are not 
numerous in comparison to the number of all participants in climate negotiations within the UN. At 
the same time, it will not affect the poor- or middle-income groups by aggravating the problem of 
poverty or slowing down economic growth in developing economies (especially considering that 
funded projects will be implemented in those countries). It will also help mitigate the problem of 
inequality in western economies, which comes to the fore in the political agenda and requires action 
from political elites. 
For BRICS countries the proposed mechanisms may be the instruments of transition toward 
inclusive low-carbon development — an objective that cannot be achieved through conventional 
carbon policies. They are also consistent with the SDG agenda which suggests that environmental, 
social and economic problems should be considered together as a complex issue to be solved 
jointly. 
Launching the proposed system of measures, at least as a framework (starting with 
monitoring emissions in terms of deciles/quantiles and developing general principles for a climate 
tax on high-income groups), could play an important role in mitigating the climate change problem. 
Given the fact that growing inequality is becoming an important factor that hinders economic 
development in many countries, a progressive tax may become more attractive in the coming years. 
And it would be beneficial if it is implemented with climate-oriented modifications. 
Taking into account the fact that the problem of inequality is becoming more acute, and 
given the incompatibility of reducing inequality and combating climate change, the solution to both 
problems is more likely to have a common ground. Even if the proposed system of measures is 
introduced as a framework, it will attract the attention of many political and civil society leaders. In 
the future, they would contribute to its full implementation. 
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За последние десятилетия человечество достигло больших успехов в преодолении проблемы 
бедности и повышении благосостояния значительной части населения развивающихся 
стран. Переход масс населения из низших слоев населения в средний класс сопровождается 
сменой моделей потребительского поведения. Растет потребление энергоемких товаров, 
как следствие, происходит скачок в потреблении энергии, а значит – в выбросах парниковых 
газов. В контексте соглашения о Целях устойчивого развития ООН 2015 г. решение проблем 
бедности и неравенства в определенной мере вступает в конфликт с целями смягчения 
глобального изменения климата. 
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Существующая международная система климатического регулирования не 
способствует преодолению этого противоречия. Сегодня глобальное управление в области 
изменения климата опирается на оценки совокупных выбросов стран без учета уровня 
развития государств и распределения выбросов по доходным группам внутри каждой 
страны. Учитываются выбросы от производства, а аспект выбросов, связанных с 
потреблением, известен, но в практическом плане не принимается во внимание. Между 
тем, на него оказывает большое влияние распределение доходов. Решения о регулировании 
выбросов принимаются на национальном уровне странами с существенными различиями в 
актуальной повестке развития, где задачи противодействия изменению климата часто 
уступают по приоритетности задачам решения других социально-экономических проблем. 
Данная работа направлена на то, чтобы предложить набор принципов и конкретных 
механизмов, способных увязать между собой решения проблем климата и неравенства. 
Это, во-первых, модификация системы мониторинга выбросов, нацеленная на учет 
выбросов от потребления (а не производства) в разрезе социальных групп. Во-вторых, 
внедрение новой системы перераспределения средств на решение проблемы глобального 
изменения климата, предполагающей «штраф» домохозяйств с высоким уровнем выбросов 
парниковых газов. Такая система схожа по идее с прогрессивным налогообложением, 
однако в отличие от нее имеет целевой характер (направлена на финансирование 
сокращения выбросов) и может быть трактована не как налогообложение высоких 
доходов, а как плата за негативную экстерналию. В-третьих, корректировка критериев 
климатического финансирования: приоритет должны получать проекты, нацеленные на 
снижение углеродоемкости потребления социальных групп, находящихся на пороге 
вступления в средний класс, а также адаптацию к изменению климата беднейшего 
населения. Особую роль в этой связи могут сыграть страны БРИКС, для которых 
внедрение данных принципов способно ускорить переход к устойчивому низкоуглеродному 
развитию. 
 
Ключевые слова: изменение климата, неравенство, энергопотребление, выбросы 
парниковых газов, устойчивое развитие 
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